When the United States and Israel launched joint air strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026, the immediate consequences were felt not only on the battlefield but in boardrooms, refineries, and petrol stations worldwide. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global crude and refined products normally flow, set in motion what the International Energy Agency (IEA) has now described as the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market.

This is not a temporary spike to be managed with hedging tools and strategic reserve releases. It is a structural rupture that is accelerating changes already underway in global energy, trade, and investment patterns. Understanding what is happening — and what it means for companies operating internationally, is no longer optional.

A Historic Supply Shock

The numbers are stark. In March 2026, global oil supply fell by 10.1 million barrels per day (mb/d), dropping to 97 mb/d. Exports transiting the Strait of Hormuz collapsed from 20 million barrels per day in February to just 3.8 million in early April, roughly 10% of pre-war levels. Oil prices recorded their largest-ever monthly gain: North Sea Dated crude pushed above $130 per barrel, while Brent futures settled around $96–$98.

In its April Oil Market Report, the IEA revised the full-year demand forecast down by 730,000 barrels per day from March, now projecting a contraction of 80,000 bpd for all of 2026. The Q2 decline of 1.5 mb/d would be the sharpest since COVID-19. In a prolonged-disruption scenario, the fall could reach 5 mb/d year-on-year. IEA member countries have already responded with the largest strategic reserve release in the agency’s history: 426 million barrels, with the US contributing over 172 million.

The Geopolitical Complexity Behind the Numbers

The war in Iran did not occur in a vacuum. It arrived against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical fragmentation: the Trump administration’s tariff policies reshaping global trade flows, China’s active repositioning as a strategic actor in energy markets, and a European Union already under pressure to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel imports.

One visible beneficiary of the disruption has been Russia. The surge in oil prices has driven Moscow’s crude export revenues sharply higher, reversing the February lows that had fallen to their weakest level since the start of the war in Ukraine. Russian crude exports rose by 270,000 barrels per day in March to 4.6 mb/d, primarily through expanded seaborne shipments.

China, meanwhile, took the opportunity in March to add 40 million barrels of crude to its strategic reserves, continuing a multi-year programme of stockpiling designed to insulate its economy from exactly this type of shock. Beijing’s long-term positioning in energy security now looks prescient.

A two-week ceasefire was announced on 7 April, but its durability remains in question. High-level negotiations in Pakistan’s capital ended without agreement, and the United States subsequently imposed a blockade on all vessels entering or departing Iranian ports. The IEA’s base case assumes a gradual, partial resumption of Hormuz flows by mid-year — but this is not a certainty, and the agency has explicitly modelled a more severe scenario.

Who Is Bearing the Impact

Aviation and petrochemicals are the hardest-hit sectors. Flight cancellations near 100% at major Middle Eastern airports have collapsed jet fuel demand, while Asian petrochemical producers dependent on Gulf LPG and naphtha have been forced to curtail output. Middle distillate prices in Singapore exceeded $290 per barrel, a record. Refineries worldwide are under strain even where they are not directly exposed to the conflict.

The geopolitical winners and losers are already visible. Russia’s crude export revenues have surged, reversing February lows; exports climbed to 4.6 mb/d in March. China used the disruption as a buying window, adding 40 million barrels to strategic reserves. A two-week ceasefire was announced on 7 April, but US-Iran talks in Islamabad ended without agreement, and Washington subsequently imposed a full port blockade on Iran. The IEA’s base case assumes partial resumption of Hormuz flows by mid-year, but explicitly models a far worse scenario if that does not hold.

What It Means for Companies Operating Internationally

For Spanish and European companies, this shock makes three strategic questions impossible to defer. Supply chain resilience: any business sourcing inputs, feedstocks, or logistics through the Gulf corridor, directly or indirectly, must reassess its supplier base now. Energy cost exposure: manufacturers, food processors, and logistics companies with high energy intensity face renewed pressure to accelerate efficiency investments and reduce petroleum dependence. And market diversification: the crisis confirms that concentration in any single region creates a fragility that cannot be managed away in real time.

The argument that clean energy is primarily an environmental choice has also shifted. Institutional investors have already noted that companies with diversified, secure energy sources have materially outperformed since the conflict began. Energy security and competitiveness are now the same conversation.

The 2026 oil shock will not resolve quickly. Companies that treat it as an operational disruption to be managed, rather than a strategic signal to act on – risk being unprepared when the next one arrives.

How Is Your Company Positioned?

At Gedeth Network, we have spent over 20 years supporting Spanish companies in their international expansion , across energy, food, technology, and other sectors. If you would like to assess the risks and opportunities your company faces in the current environment, contact us at global@gedeth.com